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Abstract 
Employment protection legislation, unemployment benefits and active la-
bor market policy are Janus-faced institutions. On the one hand they are 
devices of insurance against labor market risk that provide income and 
employment security. On the other hand they influence the capacities of 
labor markets to adapt to changing economic conditions since institutional 
features of the welfare state also affect actors’ economic adaptation 
strategies. Insufficient labor market adaptability results in higher and 
more persistent unemployment. Hence, in order to increase the adaptabil-
ity of European labor markets, reforms had to address these closely inter-
acting policy areas. The first aim of the paper is to describe recent reforms 
of employment protection, unemployment insurance and active labor mar-
ket policies in different European welfare states (Denmark, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Spain and Germany). The 
paper shows whether and to what extent national policy patterns converge 
in the direction of a new balance of flexibility and security with employ-
ment protection being eased and labor market policies being “activated” 
through a combination of “carrots and sticks”. Secondly, in terms of the 
political economy of welfare state reforms, the paper will answer the ques-
tion whether consistent reforms of the three institutions are more likely in 
political systems characterized by relative strong government and/or so-
cial partnership since such institutional prerequisites may favor “package 
deals” across policy areas. 
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1 Introduction 
In order to explain differences in labor market performance, factors de-
termining the capacity of economic actors to adapt to structural shifts or 
business cycle variations have to be taken into account. In this context, 
employment protection legislation, unemployment benefits and active la-
bor market policy are Janus-faced institutions. On the one hand they 
partly determine the overall adaptability of labor markets in that they in-
fluence actors’ behavior. On the other hand, they also constitute welfare 
state provisions of insurance against labor market risk. They not only de-
termine the level of income and employment security but also the chances 
of individual reemployment after unemployment. Since there are comple-
mentarities between these institutions, reforms to increase the dynamics 
of European labor markets had to address more than one area. This paper 
will first describe recent reform sequences affecting employment protec-
tion, unemployment benefits and active labor market policies in a number 
of European countries that belong to different regimes of welfare states: 
Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Germany. The paper shows whether and to what extent na-
tional policy patterns actually converge in the direction of a higher level of 
adaptability with employment protection being eased and labor market 
policies being activated through a combination of “carrots and sticks”. Se-
cond, regarding the politics of reforms, the paper tries to answer the 
question whether consistent reforms of the three insurance devices are 
more likely in political systems characterized by strong government 
and/or social partnership since such institutional prerequisites may favor 
reform packages.  
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2 Labor Market Regulation and Labor Market Po-
licies  
 
2.1  Different Mechanisms of Income and Employment 
Security  
Differentials in national labor market performance can to a significant ex-
tent be explained by the capacity of economic actors to adapt to structural 
shifts or business cycle variations. This capacity is determined by institu-
tional factors. The higher the labor market adaptability, the less severe 
will be the problem of persistent unemployment. As regards the set of 
relevant labor market institutions, theoretical and empirical research in 
economics (Layard/Nickell/Jackman 1991, Blanchard/Wolfers 2000) but 
also comparative welfare state research (Scharpf 2000, Hemerijck/Schludi 
2000, Auer 2000) suggest that different regimes of income and employ-
ment security are crucial factors determining the level of unemployment 
as well as the probability of reemployment after individual unemployment 
spells. Employment protection legislation (EPL), i.e. restrictions on indi-
vidual dismissals, temporary contracts and temporary work agencies, 
passive labor market policies, i.e. the level and duration of unemployment 
benefits, and the system of active labor market policies (ALMP) have two 
meanings in this context: first, they are important features of national 
welfare states which provide insurance against labor market risks; second, 
they influence structures and dynamics of labor markets. Besides EPL, 
ALMP and the benefit system, taxation and wage bargaining structures 
also influence relevant institutions. But as we focus on mechanisms of in-
surance against labor market risk, taxation and wage setting will not be 
the focus of our analysis but constitute an integral part of the institutional 
framework of analysis. 
Legal provisions on employment protection and unemployment insurance 
change the operation of labor markets fundamentally and interfere with a 
‘pure’ market in that they provide a certain level of security that would be 
absent otherwise: employment protection legislation enhances the stabil-
ity of existing jobs and thus leads to higher employment security; through 
severance payments it can provide some income security to dismissed 
workers. Income security means stabilization of individual income in case 
of unemployment by means of “passive” labor market policies, i.e. unem-
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ployment compensation and early retirement for labor market reasons. 
Reemployment security means a higher probability of returning to gainful 
employment through job placement, participation in active labor market 
policy schemes, but also “activating” interventions during the unemploy-
ment spell.   
Combinations of employment protection legislation, active and passive la-
bor market policies differ over time and space (OECD 2004, Boeri/Conde-
Ruiz/Galasso 2003). A variety of arrangements can be observed in specific 
clusters of welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990, Esping-Andersen/Regini 
2000, Arts/Gelissen 2002, Ferrera 1996, Wilthagen/van Velzen 2004): 
with reasonable simplification we can argue that ‘liberal’ welfare states 
like the UK not only provide low EPL but also lower levels of out-of-work 
benefits and less active labor market policies, while Switzerland is ‘hybrid’ 
since it provides low EPL but more generous benefits and active labor 
market policies. The same holds for Denmark which is usually joined by 
Sweden in the ‘Scandinavian’ cluster since both are big spenders on active 
and passive labor market policies, although there is no clear pattern in 
EPL. In ‘conservative’ welfare states in continental Europe, e.g. in Ger-
many and the Netherlands, EPL is rather strict while considerable re-
sources are spent on active and passive labor market policies. Finally 
‘southern’ welfare states such as Spain can roughly be described by strict 
EPL and lower levels of benefits and a less intense active labor market pol-
icy.  
2.2  Effects on Employment Performance 
As regards the effects of the diverse security mechanisms, we can identify 
positive and negative effects of interference with markets: Strict EPL can 
stabilize employment and income, strengthen commitment of workers to 
their firm and induce more investment of employers and employees in 
firm-specific human capital, but restrictive regulation reduces labor mar-
ket adaptability by inhibiting labor market transitions, i.e. job-to-job mo-
bility. Once people are made redundant this can result in longer unem-
ployment spells and lead to higher long-term unemployment. In particular 
it can hamper employment of the non-core labor, i.e. older workers, youth 
and females, and lead to a severe segmentation of labor markets since 
employment protection stabilizes the jobs of labor market insiders, mainly 
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prime-aged men, at the expense of outsiders and entrants (Lind-
beck/Snower 1988). Easing restrictions on fixed-term contracts and tem-
porary agency work increases flexibility at the margin and might, there-
fore, contribute to stronger employment growth in flexible jobs which pro-
vide entry opportunities for labor market entrants. But as long as dis-
missal protection for regular jobs remains unchanged, the creation of 
flexible jobs may coincide with severe labor market segmentation since 
transitions from flexible to stable jobs remain difficult (Saint-Paul 2002). 
From a macroeconomic point of view stricter EPL raises the costs of labor 
turnover. As with taxes on labor, if insiders can use their power to force 
firms to bear the costs generated by EPL, unemployment will increase. If 
firms are compensated for by wage adjustments, unemployment will re-
main stable. Even in this case the relative costs of hiring and firing rise 
and, as a consequence, the flows into and out of unemployment will be 
smaller which means fewer but longer unemployment spells (OECD 1999, 
2004). 
As regards unemployment benefits one can argue that a generous ‘pas-
sive’ benefit system will exert upward pressure on wages at given levels of 
unemployment, both because it reduces the fear of job loss on part of 
employees and because the unemployed can afford to be more “picky” 
when looking for a new job. Hence, unemployment benefits can increase 
the duration of individual unemployment spells since the pressure to 
search for a new job is lower, the longer and the more generous awarded 
unemployment benefits are. By raising the reservation wage unemploy-
ment insurance makes job seekers more “ambitious” regarding the earn-
ings level to be achieved. Thus, it reduces the need for wage concessions 
which in turn leads to lower wage flexibility. On the other hand, unem-
ployment benefits work as a search subsidy so that jobseekers can wait 
and choose a job offer that matches their profile better than an offer ac-
cepted because of financial need. Hence, unemployment insurance can 
contribute to more stable and productive matches on the labor market 
(Gangl 2002).  
The impact of a relatively generous benefit system might be offset by sui-
table active policy measures that raise effective labor supply by making 
the unemployed more willing to accept jobs or by making them more at-
tractive to prospective employers (Martin/Grubb 2001). Combining a gen-
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erous benefit system with well-designed active labor market programs, 
strictly applied search criteria, tests for benefit eligibility and labor market 
availability will lower unemployment (Nickell/van Ours 2000). While effec-
tive labor market policies might make the labor market more adaptable by 
providing support for up-to-date qualification or compensation of hiring 
disadvantages, participation in active labor market programs can also lead 
to lock-in effects that reduce job search efforts. That may be ineffective 
with respect to the improvement of individual chances of being hired after 
termination of the measure and may go along with high dead-weight and 
substitution effects on the macro-economic level. It may even have ad-
verse effects on non-participants through crowding-out effects. Non-
participants could also be harmed by negative side-effects of taxes or so-
cial security contributions that are raised in order to cover expenditure for 
labor market schemes.  
If employment protection and labor market policies interact differently, we 
would suppose the dynamics of labor markets to differ: restrictive em-
ployment protection will be associated with a larger share of the long-term 
unemployed and a lower participation rate of women, the young and older 
workers. The same might be expected from generous unemployment 
benefits as long as active or activating labor market policies do not inter-
vene in the unemployment spell. But different models and levels of secu-
rity can be sustained as long as overall labor market adaptability is suffi-
cient. Strict employment protection plus generous benefits and rather 
passive labor market policies might be the worst. Higher levels of unem-
ployment benefits can be compatible with good labor market performance 
if benefit receipt is made conditional upon individual job search and accep-
tance of public job offers or training measures. Therefore, in order to re-
duce unemployment persistence, reforms have to aim at increasing overall 
labor market adaptability. That means easing employment protection, 
making active labor market policies more effective in terms of their contri-
bution to qualification and reintegration into the labor market and 
strengthening work incentives of benefit recipients by activation strategies 
(Cox 1998, Kvist 2002, Clasen/Kvist/van Oorschot 2001). The concrete 
design of reforms, however, can differ according to the properties of the 
system in place.  
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3 The Role of Policy Complementarities in Labor 
Market Reform  
Since high labor market adaptability depends on an effective institutional 
arrangement of several related policy areas, reforms have to tackle more 
than only one policy field to create an institutional setting conducive to 
high employment growth and low unemployment. There are positive com-
plementarities between reforms in a double meaning (Coe/Snower 1997, 
Orszag/Snower 1999): on the one hand, positive economic complemen-
tarities can make reforms more effective because coordinated changes in 
related policy areas cause mutually reinforcing effects on labor market dy-
namics. Absence of complementary reforms in adjacent policy areas is a 
major reason for disappointing effects of isolated reforms. E.g. we can ex-
pect active or activating labor market policies to be more effective if flexi-
ble labor market regulation allows for the dynamic creation of new jobs. In 
turn, activating the long-term unemployed will be less important if unem-
ployment benefits are low and, therefore, create strong incentives to take 
up low-paid jobs. On the other hand, political complementarities can facili-
tate reforms since coordinated changes across policy areas may be more 
practicable in political terms as package deals can take opposition from 
actors fearing short-term losses into account. Hence, policy-makers could 
overcome insider resistance more easily (Lindbeck/Snower 1988, Saint-
Paul 2004). E.g., lower dismissal protection may be less worrying to insid-
ers if unemployment benefits and reemployment opportunities reassure 
them (OECD 2004).  
Effective use can be made of policy complementarities in two different 
ways: first, reforms can be part of package deals that establish a plausible 
set of reforms; second, reforms in one policy area can be complemented 
by subsequent reforms in another policy area so that the sequential order 
can generate more powerful economic effects and/or stronger public sup-
port. Hence, we expect the paths of reform to differ not only due to di-
verging points of departure in the sense of ‘path dependence’ (Pierson 
2000). We also presume that process and outcome of labor market re-
forms depend on the capacity of national political systems to implement 
complementary reforms. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that the capac-
ity to manage policy complementarities is more pronounced if one or both 
of the following conditions are met:  
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1. Government is strong in the sense that it possesses the capacity to 
formulate and implement reform strategies that affect different policy 
areas. Government capacities are weaker if veto points such as second 
chambers in federal systems, the necessity of social partner negotia-
tions, constitutional autonomy in wage setting or self-administration in 
social security exist (Immergut 1992, Jochem 2003). 
2. However, in countries where control of some areas of economic policy is 
shared with the social partners, policy complementarities can only be 
mobilized if government can coordinate reforms with employers’ asso-
ciations and trade unions. Effective tripartite coordination depends both 
on the structure of interest associations and on state capacities. Agree-
ment on ‘social pacts’ is facilitated by centralized and uncontested peak 
associations, institutionalized consultations on economic issues as well 
as by government’s capacity to formulate an agenda for tripartite nego-
tiations and credibly threat social partners with unilateral intervention 
(Ebbinghaus/Hassel 2000, Hassel 2003). 
These factors facilitate the management of policy complementarities. But 
attempts at labor market reforms have to be triggered by actors’ assess-
ment that existing institutions have to be modified in order to increase la-
bor market performance (Hemerijck/Schludi 2000). This, in turn, relies on 
the perception of labor market problems and feasible options. It may be 
furthered by policy consulting that provides actors with analytical and con-
ceptual input and hints at policy interactions that might be neglected oth-
erwise. But policy preferences of the wider public also play a role. Reforms 
are easier to implement if there is a general consensus on societal prob-
lems and objectives which can be generated by political leadership that is 
able to frame the need for reform and to shape the reform path (Cox 
2001). If no broad consensus exists, reforms depend upon support of piv-
otal groups. Hence, we can expect that reforms to increase labor market 
adaptability are more probable if groups that might benefit from them 
have ample size (Dolado/García-Serrano/Jimeno-Serrano 2002, Saint-Paul 
2002).  
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4 National Case Studies  
Our sample of seven European countries was selected for two reasons: 
First, we were interested in covering different welfare state and labor 
market regimes. Second, we wanted to focus our analysis on a number of 
countries where significant reforms were implemented over the last dec-
ade. The following section provides a historical account of labor market 
reforms supplementing the summary indicators on institutional features 
and changes that are readily available from the OECD except for the in-
tensity of activation.  
--- table 1 about here ---  
We analyze the design of reforms in employment protection legislation, 
active and passive labor market policies since the early nineties in order to 
identify underlying strategies and the major factors influencing the choice 
of reform paths. Two questions guide our research: (1) what did the dif-
ferent countries do (2) and why did they do it that way? As regards policy 
outcomes in terms of labor market adaptability we broadly refer to se-
lected general labor market indicators such as the standardized unem-
ployment rate and the employment/population ratio without claiming that 
the reforms analyzed in our paper had direct and clear-cut effects on 
these outcome variables. In addition, we consider the share of the long-
term unemployed as a supplementary variable for labor market segmenta-
tion and unemployment persistence since data on labor market mobility, 
i.e. transitions and tenure, are not available for all countries and years.  
--- table 2 about here --- 
4.1 Denmark 
The Danish welfare model has a ‘hybrid’ character. Denmark is close to 
the liberal cluster when it comes to employment protection but, when 
measured by net replacement rates of unemployment benefits and by ex-
penditure on active labor market policy, Denmark is part of the Scandina-
vian model. However, the system of labor market policies in place in the 
early nineties could not prevent a considerable increase in open unem-
ployment. To counter this, a sequence of reforms was implemented that 
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started in 1994 (Andersen 2002a, 2002b, Madsen 2004, Björklund 2000, 
van Oorschot/Abrahamson 2003, Dingeldey 2004). 
Through a series of reform steps Denmark shifted away from a rather 
“passive” type of labor market policies resulting in long periods of benefits 
dependency and withdrawal from the labor force. Based on reports by the 
independent experts of the Social Commission and the tripartite Zeuthen 
Committee published in 1992/93 which referred to constitutional principles 
of Danish social policy and emphasized the need to combine “rights and 
obligations” of the unemployed, a more activating approach was adopted 
by the new Social Democratic government in 1994, which could mobilize 
widespread societal support (Cox 2001). On the one hand, this meant that 
more attention was to be paid to individual jobseekers’ needs and to sup-
port job search efforts but also to monitor these activities. Through bind-
ing job seekers’ agreements benefit receipt was made conditional upon 
sufficient job search efforts and acceptance of job offers or labor market 
programs. Availability criteria become more demanding in terms of justifi-
cation for refusal of jobs. Failure to meet these requirements meant with-
drawal of benefits. Hence, receipt of unemployment benefits became less 
permissive while the benefit level itself was not cut. It still is one of the 
highest in Europe, in particular with respect to replacement rates for low-
wage earners. This holds for both contribution-based voluntary unem-
ployment insurance and means-tested unemployment assistance for the 
unemployed not entitled to insurance benefits (OECD 2004).  
The maximum duration of unemployment benefits was reduced from 9 ½ 
years to seven and later to four years. Since 1995 mandatory activation in 
the sense of participation in active labor market programs lasting up to 
three years set in after four years of unemployment. At the same time 
participation in active schemes did not lead to renewal of benefit entitle-
ments anymore. On the other hand participation in those active labor 
market programs that were expected to improve individual prospects such 
as training courses and hiring subsidies expanded significantly. The high 
participation of employed persons in job-related further training is particu-
larly remarkable. In order to lower registered unemployment several 
schemes that reduced labor supply were implemented. A considerable 
number of older workers withdrew from the labor market via early retire-
ment. Employed, but also unemployed persons could enter paid leave 
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schemes for further training, child rearing or personal reasons (“sabbati-
cal”).  
In combination with a further increase in public sector employment these 
reforms led to a striking decline in registered unemployment and long-
term unemployment. However, to counter labor shortages and fiscal pres-
sure on the welfare state that arose in the second half of the nineties, 
Danish policies aimed at mobilizing additional labor and activating the un-
employed more effectively. Hence, early retirement and leave schemes 
were curtailed and partially abolished after 1996. Since 1999 mandatory 
activation - particularly addressing youth, older workers and the long-term 
unemployed - set in after only one year of unemployment, and unem-
ployment insurance benefits are paid for only four years. In the late nine-
ties availability criteria became even more restrictive. Selection of training 
measures was oriented towards labor market needs instead of individual 
preferences. The social partners were involved in reorganizing the public 
employment service with more responsibilities being devolved to the re-
gional and local level.  
The third phase of labor market policy reform set in after a shift in power 
in 2002. A conservative-liberal coalition emphasized activation of people 
outside of the labor market by means of integrating the schemes for in-
sured and non-insured jobseekers and streamlining policy instruments. 
This was complemented by even stricter job search requirements laid 
down in individual action plans with the activation period starting from the 
first day of unemployment now. For the first time in Danish welfare state 
history in-work benefits were introduced to strengthen work incentives 
when taking up a low-paid job through combining partial benefit receipt 
and earned income. This policy meant a shift away from public employ-
ment and qualification which had been advocated by the Social Democrats 
in the past.  
 
In Denmark, active and passive labor market policies go hand in hand 
with liberal employment protection. There is no dismissal protection as in 
the continental European countries or Sweden. Employers are free to 
terminate employment relationships but have to pay for the first two days 
of unemployment. Severance pay is mandatory only after long tenure. 
There are no restrictions on fixed-term contracts, and certain provisions 
regulating temporary work agencies were eased in the early nineties. 
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ing temporary work agencies were eased in the early nineties. Further 
changes were not on the political agenda. Hence, the Danish economy, 
which is dominated by small and medium-sized firms, benefits from a high 
level of labor market flexibility (OECD 2004, Madsen 2002a, 2002b). Low 
employment protection is acceptable to strong trade unions since it is 
compensated for by relatively generous income replacement for the un-
employed with low prior earnings who experience a higher risk of unem-
ployment, while active and activating labor market policies support reem-
ployment. Hence, employment tenure is rather short and unemployment 
experience is more frequent in Denmark, but individual unemployment 
spells are short and the share of the long-term unemployed low. However, 
until the most recent attempts at activating inactive persons, part of the 
reduction in open unemployment was due to the reduction in labor supply 
via early retirement and leave schemes. 
The long sequence of reforms in active and activating labor market policy 
was enabled by strong involvement of the peak associations of the social 
partners in policy-making, policy advice through commissions and com-
mittees, continuous discussion of economic issues as well as by broad 
public support of the reform objectives. Government, on the other hand, 
could threaten to intervene in wage policies. Uncommonly for Denmark, 
the Social Democrats had a reliable majority in parliament after 1994. In 
this situation the social partners supported economic recovery by wage 
moderation. The Danish concertation structures allowed for the pragmatic 
fine-tuning of a more and more coherent activation strategy within a gen-
erally accepted policy framework. This implied the revocation of some 
dead-end policies such as the measures that reduced labor supply and 
kept benefit dependency at a high level in the mid-nineties. But we have 
to bear in mind that the Danish flexibility-security nexus is the outcome of 
a long historical process involving a series of negotiations and compro-
mises between the social partners about the development of the welfare 
state and the gradual implementation of a more activating profile of labor 
market policy (Benner/Vad 2000, Madsen 2005).  
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4.2  Sweden 
Sweden is often classified as most similar to Denmark in its strong em-
phasis on active labor market policy. However, we can identify notable dif-
ferences and diverging reform trajectories. In contrast to the liberal sys-
tem in Denmark, employment protection legislation in Sweden is more 
similar to continental European countries. Dismissal protection for regular 
jobs is as restrictive as in the Netherlands or Germany. As in those coun-
tries there have not been significant reforms over the period observed. In 
1994 the conservative government tried to ease dismissal protection aim-
ing to soften the principle of “first in, first out”, i.e. protection proportional 
to job tenure, in favor of core staff, and at lengthening the probationary 
period. These reforms were withdrawn by the Social Democrats in 1995 
but selection of staff to be dismissed does not follow social criteria in 
smaller enterprises with less than ten employees anymore. In addition, 
Swedish employers can hire workers on fixed-term contracts which are 
much less regulated than regular jobs. To increase labor market flexibility, 
regulation of temporary work agencies was liberalized over the eighties 
until the late nineties.  
Active labor market policy was part of the classical Rehn-Meidner model 
governing the Swedish economic policy over decades. In combination with 
a solidaristic and egalitarian wage policy, active labor market policy should 
work to increase the occupational and regional mobility of workers made 
redundant in declining industries to expanding sectors where labor short-
ages arise. Hence, training and mobility support featured prominently in 
Swedish active labor market policy (Calmfors/Forslund/Hemström 2001, 
Björklund 2000).  
The picture changed completely in the nineties. Confronted with a severe 
economic crisis and a steep increase in open unemployment that made it 
hard to place the unemployed in dynamic regions or sectors, the focus of 
active labor market policy was redirected towards locally oriented training 
programs and public relief jobs. Participation was expanded in order to 
reduce registered unemployment. The system was changed again in the 
late nineties. Based on a comprehensive evaluation of labor market poli-
cies that found little positive effects on reemployment (Calm-
fors/Forslund/Hemström 2001), the volume of resources spent on these 
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schemes was cut significantly so that the number of participants shrank 
considerably.  
With respect to unemployment insurance this meant that since 2000 par-
ticipation in active schemes did not renew entitlements to unemployment 
benefits anymore. At the same time an “activation guarantee” was intro-
duced (OECD 2003). After 60 weeks of unemployment benefit receipt, a 
period without much intervention by the public employment service, un-
employed people are assessed to find out if they have a realistic chance to 
find new jobs on their own or if they need assistance. In the first case 
benefit receipt continues for an additional period of 60 weeks, in the sec-
ond case, or if they are still unemployed after 120 weeks, the long-term 
unemployed have to participate in coaching seminars that aim at encour-
aging job search activities. If that does not work, supplementary support 
is provided through training courses. As in Denmark this is part of a bilat-
eral agreement between job seekers and the PES. Activation guarantee 
schemes are full-time, but do not have a clear maximum duration. They 
are implemented locally under the joint supervision of the PES and the 
municipalities. Following the general trend availability criteria became 
stricter in 2001. To some extent active labor market programs are used as 
work tests to assess actual availability of jobseekers. However, the em-
pirical evidence shows that activation is less consistent than in Denmark, 
the UK or the Netherlands and long-term unemployment grew, albeit on a 
low level. Despite some changes in the early and mid-nineties, unem-
ployment benefits are still quite generous in Sweden: the formal replace-
ment rate was 90%, but was reduced to 80% in 1994 and to 75% in 
1996, but rose again to 80% in 1997. While there are five waiting days 
now, maximum duration of earnings-related benefits was extended from 
300 to 600 days with the implementation of the “activation guarantee”.  
So after a phase of classical active labor market policies and a “passive” 
approach to cushion the recession of the early nineties, Sweden embarked 
on the activation path while reducing resources and participants inflow. 
Even today qualification of jobseekers through training on the job or 
through external courses is a prominent feature of Swedish active labor 
market policy. It has clear priority over placing the unemployed in low-
wage jobs. Activation, on the other hand, was introduced later and with a 
more cautious approach than in other countries. Hence, the Swedish sys-
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tem still is not as strict but more permissive than the Danish or the British 
one in the sense that “carrots” are more important than “sticks”. 
In contrast to the well-established record of Swedish corporatist concerta-
tion, the most recent reforms and also the changes in labor market policy 
were implemented through government action (Jochem 2003a, 2003b). 
However, after a breakdown in the early nineties, sectoral and subsequent 
national-level concertation of wage policy could support the recovery of 
the Swedish economy.  
4.3  United Kingdom 
The ‘liberal’ British welfare state is characterized by a relatively low level 
of employment protection and unemployment benefits. In the UK unem-
ployment benefits are part of the mandatory social security system for all 
employees. The system makes a distinction between contribution-based 
and income-based benefits with the former requiring a minimum amount 
of contributions whereas income-based benefits are means-tested and de-
pend on the family situation. The maximum duration of contribution based 
benefits is 182 days while income-based benefits have unlimited duration. 
The flat-rate benefit is only 85 € a week for unemployed people older than 
25 years so that the unemployed have to make significant wage conces-
sions when taking up new jobs.   
In the UK active labor market policies always played a much less promi-
nent role than in Scandinavian welfare states both in terms of expenditure 
and participant inflow. Early reforms in the eighties implemented by the 
Conservative government first addressed benefits for the unemployed. Al-
though the benefit level already was one of the lowest in Europe, it was 
reduced further by another 25%. Conditions for benefit receipt were tight-
ened for young people. In 1987 the new “restart program” provided closer 
monitoring of job search activities and more intense counseling and job 
placement for the long-term unemployed. This reduced individual unem-
ployment duration (Dolton/O’Neill 1997). The “Jobseekers’ Allowance” re-
placed this scheme in 1996 and increased job search requirements even 
further by shorter contact intervals with the public employment service 
and the duty to provide evidence of individual job search activities. Recipi-
ents of unemployment benefits have to accept low-paid job offers.  
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The Conservative government based its policies on the assumption that 
benefit receipt is viable only if certain job search obligations are met. To 
avoid long-term benefit dependency access to benefits had to be balanced 
by the duty to accept available job offers. Otherwise benefit receipt would 
be questioned. To strengthen work incentives the “Family Credit”, intro-
duced in 1988, provided in-work benefits for low-wage earners and fami-
lies with low income. Depending on the number of children in the house-
hold and the number of hours worked a means-tested supplementary 
benefit was paid to top up low wages.  
Whereas the Conservatives put major stress on the “sticks”, New Labor 
that came into power in 1997 shifted the emphasis a bit towards the “car-
rots” without reducing the strictness of the British way of activation and 
the emphasis on rights and duties of the unemployed. Activation policies 
were complemented by a notable expansion in active labor market 
schemes. Hence, the role of the state became a more active one in accor-
dance with New Labor’s conception of a “Third Way” between market lib-
eralism and traditional social policies and an implicit contract between the 
state and its citizens. However, participation in active schemes that aim at 
increasing individual employability was not only conceived as a supportive 
measure but was also used as an effective work test to assess labor mar-
ket availability.  
The most important features of New Labor’s welfare-to-work strategy are 
the targeted “New Deal” schemes addressing different groups of unem-
ployed persons and benefit recipients that are not unemployed in formal 
terms but receive disability and equivalent benefits such as young people, 
older workers, the disabled or single parents. To make work pay and re-
duce poverty traps inherent in a system based on means-tested transfers, 
the British in-work benefit schemes were expanded significantly. In 1999 
more generous tax benefits for low-wage earners with dependent children 
(“Working Families’ Tax Credit”) were introduced. In 2003, the new 
“Working Tax Credit” addressed single low-wage earners for the first time. 
The New Deals fit into a long-term strategy to make non-employment less 
attractive for working-age persons and to not only increase work incen-
tives but also employability through activating labor market policies.  
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In contrast to Sweden, but similar to Denmark, the United Kingdom had a 
liberal regime of employment protection at the beginning of the nineties 
which has not been changed significantly and is associated with short em-
ployment tenure. This holds not only for fixed-term contracts and tempo-
rary agency work but also for individual dismissal protection. Some mar-
ginal reforms under New Labor lead to a slight increase in regulation in-
tensity such as halving the trial period in 2000 and restricting maximum 
duration of fixed-term employment from unlimited to four years in 2002. 
Action of the Conservative government in the eighties and early nineties 
mainly addressed reforms restricting trade union power and decentralizing 
wage setting. In 1993 minimum wages set by Wage Councils were abol-
ished and reintroduced on a statutory basis in 1999 by New Labor. Al-
though this restricted wage flexibility to a certain extent, it did not do 
much harm, given the actual level of the minimum wage. In a system with 
wide wage dispersion, the introduction of the statutory minimum wage 
can be interpreted as part of the “make work pay” approach since it pro-
vided an effective wage floor thus making paid work more attractive for 
low-wage earners.  
Reforms of labor institutions in the UK are results of a long sequence that 
started in reaction to severe economic problems in the early eighties un-
der the conservative government and addressed wage setting first. Active 
or activating labor market policies were not an issue until the shift in po-
wer in 1998, with New Labor implementing the New Deal schemes that 
introduced noteworthy active labor market programs for the first time af-
ter a period characterized by the virtual absence of labor market policy in 
the UK. However, active labor market policies followed the paradigm of 
strict activation with intensive monitoring of job search activities and pro-
viding effective work tests. To strengthen work incentives for the low-
skilled unemployed and to reduce poverty in work stemming from high 
wage inequality, this was complemented by in-work benefits. These 
changes contributed to a notable decline in both unemployment and long-
term unemployment. But we have to bear in mind that part of open un-
employment is hidden by the disability scheme. The capability to adopt 
and implement these reforms was high due to the institutional strength of 
British governments resulting from majority voting, the absence of feder-
alism and the relatively weak role of the trade unions after initial reforms 
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restricting their influence (Dorey 2002). So the subsequent governments 
could implement reform sequences in accordance with they programmatic 
stance: the Conservatives with a liberal, market-oriented approach, New 
Labor with its vision of an “enabling state”. The combination of both 
seems to fit with the overall setting of the British labor market.  
4.4  Switzerland 
Although the Swiss welfare state has a different origin and a much shorter 
history than the Danish one, it is now quite similar and could also be best 
described as ‘hybrid’ between liberal and Scandinavian welfare regime. 
Both labor market regimes combine low employment protection with gen-
erous unemployment benefits and strict activation.  
On the one hand, the flexibility of the Swiss labor market results from a 
low level of labor market regulation in terms of employment protection 
and from decentralized industrial relations. Dismissal protection is weak 
since notice periods are short and employers do not have to justify termi-
nation of contracts. So there is not much room for severance pay except 
for employees with long tenure or for legal action. In contrast to Denmark, 
however, collective agreements are much less relevant for the definition of 
wages and working conditions in Switzerland. Due to firm-based negotia-
tions wage flexibility is high although wage dispersion remains limited. 
Together with a low level of non-wage labor costs the adaptability of the 
Swiss labor market is high which is shown by considerable mobility on the 
labor market and an impressive labor market performance in terms of 
high employment rates and low unemployment despite the fact that the 
Swiss economy suffered from low growth rates over the nineties (Straub-
haar/Werner 2003).  
Whereas these institutional features did not change over the period under 
scrutiny, active labor market policies and unemployment insurance un-
derwent fundamental modifications since the early nineties. Until the late 
seventies there was only rudimentary unemployment insurance, and until 
the early nineties active labor market policies were negligible. Unemploy-
ment benefits became more generous over the eighties with a maximum 
duration of two years and a benefit level of 70 to 80% of previous earn-
ings depending on household composition. Faced with a sharp increase in 
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open unemployment and a growing share of the long-term unemployed in 
the early nineties, unemployment insurance legislation was revised thor-
oughly in 1995. This reduced the unconditional benefit period to 150 days 
with longer benefit duration up to 520 days being dependent upon partici-
pation in active labor market programs. Since 2003 maximum duration of 
unemployment benefit is 400 days.  
Swiss studies had shown that longer passive benefit duration led to longer 
unemployment spells (Sheldon 2002). Therefore, strict activation had to 
counterbalance the negative incentives stemming from long benefit dura-
tion and a generous benefit level. Consequently the new system, in place 
since 1997, expanded resources devoted to active labor market policy 
schemes directed at reintegration into employment. Subsidized temporary 
employment, a scheme that tops up earnings if the unemployed accept a 
job that provides less net earnings than the unemployment benefit, is no-
table. This instrument has a good reputation as regards its effectiveness 
(Gerfin/Lechner/Steiger 2003, Gerfin/Lechner 2001). Parallel to changes 
in active measures the administrative set-up of Swiss labor market poli-
cies was modernized with regional placement offices taking charge of be-
nefit payment, placement, monitoring job search efforts and selection of 
appropriate activation schemes for unemployed individuals. The perform-
ance of regional offices, which had been created in 1995, is benchmarked 
and partly determines budget allocation. This led to a significant increase 
in efficiency.  
The design of labor market policies in Switzerland benefited from the fact 
that, due to the virtual absence of such policies before the early nineties, 
policy-makers did not have to take policy legacies into account but could 
build their system upon the OECD’ recommendations for an activating la-
bor market policy. With this efficiently managed regime of “carrots and 
sticks”, Switzerland was able to reduce unemployment in the following pe-
riod of economic recovery from 1997 onwards although long-term unem-
ployment rose a bit. Additional expenditure on active programs was set off 
by savings on unemployment benefits. Hence, open unemployment is still 
low in Switzerland, although economic growth has been rather weak. 
As regards the politics of reforms, Swiss policy-makers could rely on a 
general societal consensus on the legitimacy of an activating approach in 
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labor market policy and a liberal labor law, but also on an efficient and 
economical use of public resources. Public policies in Switzerland are made 
in a consociational system with a strong federal element. This does not 
only mean devolution of power to the cantons, but also high consensus 
requirements at the federal level. In order to implement the national legal 
framework of labor market policy and the principle of activation consis-
tently and to ensure commitment by actors at the regional level, national 
policy-makers relied on transparent information and independent policy 
evaluation.  
4.5  The Netherlands  
Compared to the Scandinavian and the liberal welfare states, the Nether-
lands show a different point of departure both in employment protection 
and in labor market policy, but also a peculiar reform path. Labor market 
reforms in the Netherlands were implemented over more than two dec-
ades. They can only be interpreted appropriately with reference to the se-
vere economic crisis of the early eighties and the path-breaking Was-
senaar agreement on welfare state reform, wage restraint and working 
time flexibility (Visser/Hemerijck 1997). This bipartite agreement between 
the social partners was initiated in 1982 by the Dutch government through 
a credible threat of intervention. In the following years several steps were 
undertaken to make the Dutch labor market more flexible. This resulted in 
collective agreements on working time flexibility and wage moderation 
and a removal of barriers to part-time work.  
Regarding employment protection, the Netherlands had one of the most 
restrictive systems of dismissal protection in the early eighties. Even be-
fore labor market policies were reformed, first steps were taken to in-
crease labor market flexibility. However, this did non concern dismissal 
protection but the creation of a flexible segment at the margin of the labor 
market. Different types of not explicitly regulated “Flex jobs” such as 
fixed-term contracts, temporary agency work, stand-by contracts or free-
lancing grew strongly (van Oorschot 2004). 
Both the expansion of flexible jobs and part-time employment contributed 
significantly to the Dutch employment ‘miracle’. However, reforming labor 
market regulation was also an issue in Dutch policy-making in the nine-
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ties. In 1993 the social partners agreed on a joint strategy in favor of a 
“New Course” that combined working time policy and regulatory issues. 
Three years later employers and trade unions signed an agreement on 
“Flexicurity” that referred to a government proposal (Camps 2004, He-
merijck 2003). It was implemented through several laws which increased 
labor market flexibility and provided higher employment protection for 
workers in the flexible segment of the Dutch labor market. Hence, it 
aimed at reducing the gap in regulation intensity between the core and 
the margin of the labor market. In 1998, new legislation lifted major re-
striction on temporary agency work and provided equal payment whereas 
the subsequent “Flexicurity” law strengthened employment security of 
workers with fixed-term contracts and employees of temporary work 
agencies in 1999.  
The law stipulates that fixed-term contracts can be renewed three times in 
three years. After the third renewal or after an overall duration of more 
than three years fixed-term contracts turn into permanent ones. Tempo-
rary agency workers benefit from their contract being considered a regular 
one and from a phase model that binds the level of employment security 
to the duration of the employment relationship. Whereas employment 
ends with each assignment in the first 26 weeks, the consecutive phases 
raise employment and income security. After 26 weeks workers are cov-
ered by pension schemes and get access to job-related training. They can 
now claim continuation of payment in periods without assignments or in 
case of sickness and at least three months’ fixed-term employment after 
52 weeks of employment. After 18 or 36 months, a permanent contract 
between the agency and the worker is established. It is most notable that 
Dutch legislation on “flexicurity” also modified dismissal protection for the 
first time by reducing notice periods and streamlining administrative pro-
cedures. Dutch dismissal law is based on a dual system. On the one hand, 
an employer can dismiss a worker without severance pay if he is permit-
ted to do so by the public administration. On the other hand, he can re-
quest a court to dissolve the employment contract which is possible with 
sufficient justification and compensatory payments. While the first option 
entails legal insecurity, the second one demands considerable severance 
pay (OECD 2004).   
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Part-time work, however, expanded due to changes in private sector re-
cruitment and growing female labor supply without public policies encour-
aging this type of flexible employment. It was facilitated by the existence 
of a universal flat-rate public pension scheme and after the strong growth 
of part-time employment in the eighties, certain working time and earn-
ings thresholds were lifted: Since 1993 part-time workers are covered by 
the statutory minimum wage and a pro-rata entitlement to vacation bonus 
payments, in 1994 they were incorporated into occupational pension 
schemes, and in 1996 the principle of equal treatment of full- and part-
time workers in labor law and collective agreements was stipulated. In the 
year 2000 workers were entitled to demand working time reduction or ex-
tension from their employers. As is the case with most relevant reforms in 
the Netherlands, these modifications were prepared through dialogue with 
the social partners (van Oorschot 2004, Hemerijck 2003).  
Although part of the social policy reforms in the eighties also addressed 
unemployment benefits and lowered them, active or activating labor mar-
ket policies appeared on the Dutch policy agenda much later (Vis-
ser/Hemerijck 1997, van Oorschot/Abrahamson 2003). In August 1996 
the system of benefit sanctions was intensified considerably. Benefit re-
cipients may get a reduction of their benefits if they do not follow the 
rules related to the benefits. In case of voluntary quits or dismissals 
caused by personal misconduct no benefits can be received. If unem-
ployed persons reject training or suitable job offers, benefits are sus-
pended or cut. Criteria defining suitable jobs were made more restrictive. 
A sanction rate of 36% of the average stock of benefit claims of unem-
ployment benefit recipients is among the highest in OECD countries 
(Nickell/van Ours 2000). The same type of benefit sanctions exists for so-
cial assistance. These changes on the “passive” side were more important 
than innovation in active labor market policies. The restructuring of the 
benefit system with stricter rules on availability and suitability are cer-
tainly measures supporting the ‘Dutch miracle’ in the nineties.  
After a phase of remarkable employment growth and a decline in open 
unemployment, reintegration of long-term unemployed and activation of 
non employed persons became an issue in the Netherlands (van Oor-
schot/Abrahamson 2003). This policy reorientation was inspired by the 
need to partially reduce state intervention and strengthen market forces in 
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the Dutch welfare state, which was expressed in an influential paper is-
sued by the WRR council for policy advice. “Jobs, Jobs, Jobs” were made 
an effective policy objective by the new social democratic-liberal govern-
ment that gained power in 1994.  
This implied policy reforms aimed at a better integration of low-skilled 
workers through low wage employment and a consistent activation strat-
egy making benefit receipt conditional upon acceptance of active meas-
ures or job offers. This resulted in a fundamental shift away from costly, 
but passive labor market policies in favor of a more integration-oriented 
approach. Apart from stricter sanctioning, the complex system of active 
measures in the Netherlands was supplemented after 1994 by two impor-
tant elements: on the one hand, targeted schemes to further labor market 
integration of the young, the low-skilled, women or migrants were ex-
panded and became effective work tests. This also comprised subsidized 
employment with public or private employers as well as temporary agency 
placements in the public sector for the long-term unemployed. Similar 
measures were taken by the municipalities responsible for social assis-
tance. On the other hand, employers’ social security contributions were 
reduced at the bottom end of the wage scale to further demand for low-
skilled labor, whereas a more generous basic tax allowance and, in 
2001/02, tax benefits for both employers and employees were imple-
mented to facilitate transitions from benefit receipt or subsidized employ-
ment to regular employment and to top up low net earnings.  
While activation strategies mainly addressed the unemployed in the nine-
ties, they were expanded to activate larger groups of inactive persons 
such as recipients of disability benefits, which had been used to reduce 
labor supply over many years. Neither resources spent on active labor 
market policy nor benefit levels were cut significantly, but resources were 
redirected towards activation, and conditions for benefit receipt made 
more demanding. However, in 2004, earnings-related benefits available 
after expiry of unemployment insurance benefits with a maximum dura-
tion of five years were abolished. Nevertheless, Dutch unemployment 
benefits are still quite generous. 
Dutch activation strategies were complemented by a complete overhaul of 
the public employment service. Since 2002, all unemployed persons are 
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dealt with by one-stop-shops (CWI) that are responsible for informing and 
assessing job seekers through profiling but are in charge of neither benefit 
payments nor provision of active labor market policy instruments. All ac-
tive measures, including placement and more intensive consulting of job 
seekers, are contracted out to private service providers which are remu-
nerated in case of successful placement, the concrete payment being de-
pendent upon time and effort defined in the profiling procedure. A similar 
system exists for social assistance recipients.  
The overall picture of labor market reforms in the Netherlands is one of a 
shift from passive to activating labor market policies in the nineties while 
leaving the benefit level virtually untouched but tightening conditions for 
benefit receipt. This helped reduce the unemployment rate and long-term 
unemployment. At the same time Dutch policy-makers during the nineties 
tried to increase labor market flexibility and overcome segmentation be-
tween the core and the margin by raising employment security of flexible 
jobs and moderately reducing the restrictive character of individual dis-
missal protection. All major reforms in the Netherlands between 1982 and 
the early years of the current decade were formulated and implemented in 
a political framework characterized by strong social partnership. However, 
in critical moments government could provide necessary impulses to re-
form and credibly threaten employers and trade unions with unilateral ac-
tion or intervention. This is not only true for the initial agreement of 1982 
but also for the new sequence of reforms triggered in 1993. The Dutch 
tripartite setting facilitated the long sequence of institutional adaptation of 
the labor market through package deals that provided compensation for 
wage moderation or welfare state retrenchment by tax concessions. The 
positive medium-term experience with structural reforms strengthened 
commitment to the reform process and therefore made further institu-
tional changes possible (Hemerijck/Schludi 2000). Pragmatic decision-
making was also supported by the strong position of expert committees 
such as the WRR that provided influential analyses and policy proposals 
and by the important contributions of the Central Planning Bureau (Vis-
ser/Hemerijck 1997, Hemerijck 2003). 
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4.6  Spain 
The Southern welfare state of Spain can be characterized by a sequence 
of reforms aiming at increased labor market flexibility through relaxation 
of employment protection (Bover/García-Perea/Portugal  2000, 
Dolado/García-Serrano/Jimeno-Serrano 2002, Toharia/Malo 2000). The 
pattern of reforms is similar to the Dutch experience in that Spain also 
had to deal with a system with restrictive individual dismissal protection. 
This was inherited from the Franco era. Facing high unemployment, the 
socialist government in 1984 initiated reforms to liberalize fixed-term con-
tracts that had been banned before. Hence, employers could expand their 
labor force on a temporary basis without encountering prohibitive firing 
costs. This resulted in a dynamic growth of fixed-term contracts for labor 
market outsiders or entrants, such as young people, while leaving the la-
bor market insiders covered by dismissal protection virtually untouched. 
Until the mid-nineties fixed-term employment grew to about one third of 
all jobs in Spain. Employment growth was mainly a phenomenon of the 
flexible segment, whereas transitions between fixed-term and open-ended 
contracts remained difficult.  
The second stage of reforms in employment protection addressed regula-
tion of the core labor market. In 1994 und 1997 reforms addressed regu-
lar contracts in that they reduced severance pay for dismissed workers, 
made dismissals for organizational reasons easier and lowered social secu-
rity contributions by 40 to 80% for two years if fixed-term contracts were 
turned into permanent ones or if workers were hired on a permanent basis 
right away. These measures aimed at easing labor market entry and mak-
ing permanent contracts more accessible to younger people and older 
workers. They were extended to women and the long-term unemployed in 
2001. For the first time, fixed-term employees were entitled to severance 
pay of eight days’ salary for each year in employment. Temporary agency 
work was legalized in 1994 but regulated more restrictively in 1997. In 
1999 equal treatment of permanent employees and agency workers was 
stipulated which slowed down further expansion of agency work.  
Spanish experience shows that flexibility at the margin of the labor market 
helps reduce long-term unemployment by fuelling labor turnover. The 
share of the long-term unemployed declined from 67% to 47% between 
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1987 and 1992 while the share of fixed-term employment rose from 15% 
to 33%. Unemployment spells of people with preceding fixed-term con-
tracts are shorter than those of former permanent employees. Hence, 
former fixed-term employees are hired more often than people who had a 
regular contract in the past (Dolado/García-Serrano/Jimeno-Serrano 
2002). On the other hand fixed-term employees often receive lower wages 
and experience severe difficulties in transition to permanent contracts. 
They only have limited access to enterprise-specific further training. Liber-
alization of fixed-term contracts was a major tool to promote employment 
growth and structural adaptation in the Spanish case where reforming re-
gular jobs was not a viable option in the early phase of the reforms. But 
moderate transition to a more flexible dismissal protection and re-
regulation of fixed-term contracts in the mid-nineties did not help over-
come the dual character of the Spanish labor market completely, albeit 
the growth of the share of the fixed-term employed came to a halt and 
was even reversed in the private sector. The vast majority of young peo-
ple still have fixed-term contracts, but employment growth in the late 
nineties mainly took place in regular jobs. As regards the effects of the 
reform, employment of young members of the labor force was affected in 
a positive way and transitions of young and older workers to regular jobs 
were eased. Wage differentials between open-ended and fixed-term em-
ployment disadvantaging labor market entrants have grown considerably 
in Spain, whereas skill-related wage dispersion in regular contracts is 
compressed (Hernanz/Jimeno-Serrano/Kugler 2003).  
Although Spain joins the Netherlands with its sequence of reforms at the 
margin followed by moderate modifications of the core in labor market 
regulation, differences are more pronounced in labor market policies (Da-
via et al. 2001). Benefit levels and resources spent on both active and 
passive instruments are clearly less generous than in the Dutch case, and 
only for labor market insiders with regular contracts severance payments 
can be considered a substitute for unemployment benefits. After an ex-
pansion of benefit levels and coverage in the second half of the eighties, 
replacement rates were cut in 1992/93 by the Socialist government, con-
tribution periods extended and availability criteria defined in a stricter 
way. Due to the expansion of fixed-term employment this resulted in a 
significant decline in benefit coverage. At the same time access to unem-
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ployment assistance was restricted to persons living in household with an 
aggregate income of less than 75% of the national minimum wage. Until 
2001 these changes resulted in a significant reduction of benefit receipt 
and resources spent on passive labor market policy. Unemployment and 
the share of the long-term unemployed went down considerably.  
Activation of the unemployed in Spain was mainly inspired by EU level re-
commendations that provided not only a blueprint for policy design. In 
2002, this provoked the conservative government to making benefit re-
ceipt conditional upon the job seeker signing an activity obligation and to 
impose stricter sanctions in case of unjustified benefit receipt and refusal 
of suitable jobs. However, this bill was withdrawn after a severe conflict 
with trade unions, which had not been consulted before. Implementing 
policies compatible to EU recommendations was also essential for Spain in 
order to get access to EU resources to be spent on labor market policies. 
About half of the limited budget devoted to active labor market policies in 
Spain comes from European funds. It is mainly spent on temporary em-
ployment of selected target groups such as young people, women and the 
long-term unemployed. Resources gained from employers and employees 
via contributions to the joint training fund are spent on further job-related 
training of employed persons, not the unemployed. There is no unlimited 
means-tested social assistance for those unemployed who loose their enti-
tlement to normal unemployment benefits. Income support for the long-
term unemployed is very low level and limited in time.  
Referring to the politics of labor market reforms in Spain, trade unions 
could rely on strong insider protection due to prohibitive dismissal costs 
and on financial support from the state. In order to circumvent trade un-
ion resistance, a more flexible labor market could only be achieved via de-
regulation at the margin. However, strong growth of fixed-term employ-
ment fundamentally changed the operation of the Spanish labor market 
and the political constellation with a considerable part of the labor force 
now employed in unstable jobs. This opened the window of opportunity 
and made modification of dismissal protection a viable option in political 
terms (Dolado/García-Serrano/Jimeno-Serrano 2002). Liberalization of 
temporary contracts in 1984 was triggered by a situation of very high un-
employment which forced insiders to make concessions, whereas subse-
quent reforms were facilitated by the considerable share of workers in the 
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 19/2005    31
flexible segment. Most labor market reforms in Spain were formulated in 
trilateral talks by government, employers and trade union and often im-
plied package deals, such as easing dismissal protection being exchanged 
for stricter regulation of temporary agency work. Evidence from 2002 
shows that government attempts to impose certain reforms unilaterally 
can hardly succeed. However, due to increased spending funded by EU 
sources, active labor market policies that had been negligible in the past 
became a more prominent feature of the Spanish labor market so that 
policy-makers could exploit potential policy complementarities not avail-
able before.  
4.7  Germany  
As many other European continental welfare state countries, Germany 
produces security and wage gains for protected insiders at the cost of job 
loss and exclusion of outsiders. Similar to Spain and the Netherlands, 
Germany had restrictive employment protection legislation until the mid-
eighties. Restrictions on fixed-term contracts and temporary work agen-
cies were lifted through several consecutive reform steps, the first dating 
back to 1985. In contrast to this medium-term trend, the latest changes 
concerning fixed-term contracts increased regulation slightly. The most 
recent amendments, implemented in the context of the “Hartz-reforms” 
put forward by the red-green coalition, lifted almost all restrictions on 
temporary agency work while establishing the principle of equal treatment 
between agency workers and permanent staff which can only be circum-
vented by collective agreements on wages and working conditions. Re-
strictive dismissal protection provisions were hardly changed over the last 
decades. Minor reforms of dismissal protection raised and lowered the size 
threshold of firms to be exempt from restrictive dismissal protection with-
out questioning the general system. In addition, the latest reform, in force 
since 2004, introduced a right of the worker to opt for severance pay in-
stead of the right to file a suit against the employer. 
As regards active and passive labor market policy, a costly system had 
been in place since the late sixties. It combined generous unemployment 
insurance benefits with a full-blown system of active labor market policy 
measures. As regards unemployment benefits, unemployment insurance 
provides for earnings-related benefits of 63 or 67% of net earnings ac-
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cording to household properties. This rate was not changed over time but 
maximum benefit duration was increased in the eighties so that older 
workers can receive earnings-related benefits for up to 32 months, 
whereas the younger unemployed are only entitled to 12 months. Recent 
reforms of reduced benefit duration in unemployment insurance have 
been postponed. Until the end of 2004 an earnings-related but means-
tested unemployment assistance scheme was in place that provided 53% 
or 57% of net earnings with infinite duration.  
Whereas the effectiveness of German labor market policies was never 
subject to any systematic evaluation until the late nineties, a paradigm 
shift took place over the last years. First, based on a critical evaluation of 
the impact of active labor market policies on individual job prospects, the 
design of active measures and benefits was questioned. In 2002, this re-
sulted in legislation that moved away from permissive benefit receipt and 
voluntary participation in labor market schemes towards stricter activa-
tion, making benefit receipt conditional upon individual job search and 
participation in ALMP. However, due to severe deficits in governance and 
performance of the Federal Employment Agency, the “Hartz Commission”, 
an expert commission charged with the formulation of a blueprint for 
ALMP reform, urged for internal reforms of the PES and a more coherent 
activating labor market policy. This was implemented through a sequence 
of bills. Apart form restructuring the PES, the most important step was the 
abolishment of earnings-related unemployment assistance for the long-
term unemployed by “Hartz IV”. It was replaced by a flat-rate benefit 
similar to social assistance (“Arbeitslosengeld II”). In addition, former re-
cipients of unemployment assistance and employable social assistance 
claimants are being activated more consistently in the framework of local 
job placement agencies.  
The general picture evolving in Germany after many years of piecemeal 
reforms is one of stricter activation being combined with moderate cut-
backs in benefit generosity and eased regulation of flexible jobs while 
German policy-makers refrained from stronger benefit cuts and bold de-
regulation of the core labor market. These reforms have only been partial 
in character and were not substantial enough to successfully adapt the 
German economy to ongoing changes as is shown by the long-term rise in 
unemployment and the share of the long-term unemployed. Therefore, no 
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stable and efficient policy combination of flexibility and security could be 
achieved so far. The experience of past attempts at more comprehensive 
reforms is mixed at best. Since German governments are relatively weak 
due to social partner autonomy in wage setting and the federalist joint-
decision trap (Scharpf 1988) and because of lacking institutional prerequi-
sites for social partner negotiations, tripartite talks in the “Alliance for 
Jobs” failed. In contrast to the Netherlands, Germany could not address 
massive need to reform via effective social pacts (Streeck 2003). Attempts 
at government-driven reforms like the Hartz package or the subsequent 
“Agenda 2010” were watered down by joint policy making in German fed-
eralism and a fragile political basis for reforms due to strong resistance 
from powerful insider groups and the lack of societal consensus (Cox 
2000) despite the fact that tackling unemployment is often mentioned in 
the wider public as the foremost political issue. Although the need for fur-
ther institutional adaptation remains urgent, the prospects of far-reaching 
structural reforms are vague. The German political system, characterized 
by a weak government facing strong interest associations, seems incapa-
ble of designing and implementing a sequence of reform steps that in-
creases labor market adaptability effectively.  
5 Comparative Analysis: Different Paths of Re-
form  
Our analysis shows different paths of labor market reforms. It makes 
sense to differentiate between three groups of countries: on the one hand, 
we have European welfare states with a low initial level of labor market 
regulation which was not reduced further. These countries concentrated 
on implementing stricter activation policies with active elements, appear-
ing rather late in the UK with the shift to New Labor’s “New Deals” and in 
Switzerland where active programs were designed according to OECD 
blueprints. In contrast, Denmark ‘activated’ its full-blown system of active 
labor market policy in the early nineties. However, whereas in the United 
Kingdom modest benefits were cut, they were kept intact in Denmark and 
in Switzerland. All countries belonging to this cluster now combine liberal 
labor market regulation with intense activation - but in contrast to ‘liberal’ 
UK, the ‘hybrid’ countries Denmark and Switzerland still provide a gener-
ous level of unemployment benefits if the unemployed comply with the 
requirements imposed upon them. As regards resulting labor market per-
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formance, this setting turns out to be a favorable one in terms of achiev-
ing and maintaining low unemployment and long-term unemployment, 
although employment growth – at a high level of employment – was less 
impressive. The specific lesson we can draw from the Danish and Swiss 
example is that of the positive effects of low employment protection on 
the dynamism of the labor market. If a liberal regime of employment pro-
tection is combined with institutions that support income and reemploy-
ment security, one can obtain a well-functioning employment system 
without dismantling the welfare state.  
--- Table 3 about here ---  
The third group consists of the countries that had a high level of EPL at 
the outset, i.e. the countries in continental and Southern Europe (the 
Netherlands, Germany and Spain) but also Sweden. Initial reforms of EPL 
in the eighties and early nineties increased flexibility at the margin 
through lifting restrictions on fixed-term contracts and temporary agency 
work in order to create additional flexible jobs and increase overall labor 
market flexibility. However, at that point in time, individual dismissal pro-
tection applicable to regular jobs was left untouched. The next wave of 
reforms raised the level of job protection for workers in flexible jobs while 
moderately reducing the level of individual dismissal protection. This can 
be interpreted as a reaction to strong growth of the flexible segment and 
increasingly dual character of these labor markets. Nevertheless, labor 
market insiders were not affected by considerable deregulation. Transi-
tions between the margin and the core of the labor market are still more 
difficult than in other countries.  
With respect to labor market policy, these countries followed similar 
paths. The common policy shift from costly but fairly passive labor market 
policies to stricter activation was implemented quite early in the mid-
nineties in the Netherlands and about a decade later in Germany and 
Sweden. Benefits for the unemployed were essentially left untouched in 
the Netherlands. Transfers to the German long-term unemployed were 
reduced recently, whereas in Sweden benefit duration was expanded with 
benefit levels being cut slightly. In Spain, an expansion of benefits in the 
1980s was followed by benefit cuts in the early nineties. So we see con-
vergence towards activation policies with stricter monitoring of jobs 
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search, more frequent sanctions and more restrictive availability criteria, 
but no significant reductions of benefit levels. Since less permissive bene-
fit systems make receipt of income out of work less convenient, job-
seekers tend to make concessions regarding the wage level of jobs of-
fered. However, even though EPL was eased over the last decade, flexibil-
ity of the labor market is so insufficient in these countries that the poten-
tial for the creation of additional jobs available for ‘activated’ jobseekers is 
still limited.  
--- Table 4 about here  
Our analysis could not provide clear-cut evidence on strategic policy-
making using political and economic complementarities between labor 
market regulation and labor market policies in the sense of a close se-
quential or simultaneous coupling. But in a longer-term perspective we 
can see that countries with strong social partner institutions benefit from 
their capacity to identify needs for reform and to agree on appropriate 
remedy. ‘Liberal’ welfare regimes have strong built-in labor market 
adaptability due to the strength of market forces as both EPL and 
unemployment benefits are weak. Increasing labor market adaptability is 
a more urgent need for Scandinavian, continental and southern welfare 
states with stronger employment protection and/or more generous unem-
ployment benefits. With hindsight we can argue that those countries were 
more successful in creating a more adaptable labor market, that could rely 
on effective capacities to manage policy complementarities: during the 
decisive years under scrutiny, in Denmark and the Netherlands, there was 
a strong political leadership that could mobilize societal support and rely 
on cooperative social partner relations and influential policy advice. This 
does not mean, however, that all reforms were implemented smoothly. 
Regarding Switzerland we can point at a strong consociational system.  
However, taking a closer look at “successful” models we can see that they 
rely on preconditions which are not easily transferable. Low EPL in combi-
nation with high benefit levels constitutes the Danish flexibility-security 
nexus, which in its current version has already been in place since the late 
1960s apart from the recent emphasis on activation. Such a system is 
easier to achieve if countries never introduced strict EPL, which is hard to 
abolish later on. The same holds for the ‘hybrid’ Swiss model where pre-
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existing ‘liberal’ EPL was supplemented by unemployment benefits and 
effective activation consistent with OECD recommendations. This was fa-
cilitated by the virtual absence of labor market policies prior to this re-
form. In contrast to these experiences, acceptance of a more flexible re-
gime of labor market regulation and a strict activation strategy accompa-
nied by benefit cuts remains a delicate issue in continental and southern 
European countries. Here the demand for capacities to manage policy 
complementarities is most pronounced since labor market insiders benefit 
from the status quo and can oppose policies that imply short-term losses 
for them. Thus, policy makers have to design packages that are feasible in 
political terms. And successful settings might erode as is shown by the 
most recent developments in the Netherlands.  
6 Conclusion 
Our analysis shows how employment protection legislation, active and 
passive labor market policies were redesigned in selected European wel-
fare states over the last decade. It suggests that labor market adaptability 
benefits from, first, relaxing EPL and, second, from introducing activating 
elements in labor market policies, whereas maintaining a high benefit 
level does not seem to be incompatible with lowering unemployment. The 
challenges countries faced, however, were uneven. We can see that coun-
tries departed from different starting points and embarked on diverging 
paths of reform although all of them tried to ease EPL and to introduce 
activating elements into labor market policy. A high level of labor market 
adaptability was achieved in the ‘liberal’ system of the UK and the ‘hybrid’ 
models of Denmark and Switzerland. These countries benefited from the 
absence of strict EPL and a considerable redesign of labor market policies. 
Whereas in the UK unemployment benefits are fairly limited, Denmark and 
Switzerland maintained a generous benefit system while making access 
more demanding. While Denmark shifted from a passive labor market pol-
icy regime to an activating one via a sequence of fine-tuning, the UK and 
Switzerland introduced active and activating elements much later. Both 
‘hybrid’ models could rely on strong consociational or corporatist ar-
rangements so that institutional adaptation was relatively smooth.  
To avoid conflicts with insiders, countries that started with stricter EPL 
such as Germany, the Netherlands and Spain, first introduced flexibility at 
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the margin and subsequently deregulated the core to a certain extent whi-
le increasing employment protection in the flexible segment. Activation 
strategies were also implemented in these countries, but since flexibility of 
the labor market is only limited, economic success and political acceptance 
of activation strategies is more disputed in these countries. Political sup-
port for more far-reaching policy reforms is fragile due to strong labor 
market segmentation and limited short-term effects of reforms. So the 
profound changes required stress the demand for capacities to manage 
policy complementarities in economic and political terms. This was only 
partially successful and viable over a limited period of time if we refer to 
the Dutch experience with social pacts or the government-driven Hartz 
reforms in Germany. Since the success of activation depends on labor 
market flexibility in terms of regulation and wages, continental and south-
ern countries still face considerable need for reform. In these countries, 
the transition to a more adaptable labor market seems difficult, given the 
discrepancy between the extent of reforms needed and strong path de-
pendence reinforced by insider opposition so that government capacities 
and social partnership are crucial for designing reforms that exploit com-
plementarities in a way that sufficient support can be generated. In these 
cases it might be viable to combine strict activation with maintaining 
higher benefit levels in order to make deregulation more acceptable to in-
siders. This requires strong political leadership, a general understanding of 
societal objectives and a certain level of trust between social partners 
(and/or political actors) which allows for employment protection to be re-
duced while other security mechanisms are recalibrated. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Changes in EPL, ALMP and Unemployment Benefits  
Sources: OECD Employment Outlook, various editions; OECD Benefits and Wages, OECD 
Benefit Systems and Work Incentives.  
 
 Den-
mark 
Sweden United 
Kingdom 
Switzerland Nether-
lands 
Spain Ger-
many 
Employment Protection Legislation 
Fixed-term contracts  
Late 1980s 2,3 2,7 0,0 1,3 1,5 2,0 3,5 
Late 1990s 2,3 1,8 0,0 1,3 0,8 2,5 1,8 
2003 2,3 1,8 0,3 1,3 0,8 3,0 1,8 
Temporary work agencies  
Late 1980s 4,0 5,5 0,5 1,0 3,3 5,5 4,0 
Late 1990s 0,5 1,5 0,5 1,0 1,6 4,0 2,8 
2003 0,5 1,5 0,5 1,0 1,6 4,0 1,8 
Dismissal Protection  
Late 1980s 1,5 2,9 0,9 1,2 3,1 3,9 2,6 
Late 1990s 1,5 2,9 0,9 1,2 3,1 2,6 2,7 
2003 1,5 2,9 1,1 1,2 3,1 2,6 2,7 
Overall strictness of regulation  
Late 1980s 2,3 3,5 0,6 1,1 2,7 3,8 3,2 
Late 1990s 1,4 2,2 0,6 1,1 2,1 2,9 2,5 
2003 1,4 2,2 0,6 1,1 2,1 3,1 2,2 
Expenditure on active labor market policy in % of GDP 
1993 1,97 2,98 0,57 0,39 1,24 0,53 1,62 
1998 1,89 2,01 0,34 0,70 1,76 0,72 1,27 
2003 1,74 1,29 0,53 0,77 1,83 0,72 1,14 
Change in PP  -0,23 -1,69 -0,04 0,38 0,59 0,19 -0,48 
Expenditure on passive labor market policy in % of GDP 
1993 5,49 2,77 1,60 1,64 2,87 3,59 2,59 
1998 3,74 1,91 0,63 1,07 3,14 1,64 2,29 
2003 2,68 1,22 0,37 1,02 1,86 1,48 2,31 
Change in PP  -2,81 -1,55 -1,23 -0,63 -1,01 -2,11 -0,28 
Unemployment benefit generosity (gross replacement rates for different earnings) 
1993 51 28 19 30 53 32 28 
1997 62 27 18 34 52 31 26 
2001 51 24 17 38 53 31 28 
Net replacement rates of unemployment benefits, average production worker, single, first 
month of unemployment  
1997 62 72 50 73 75 76 60 
1999 63 71 46 81 82 74 60 
2002 59 81 45 72 71 70 61 
Net replacement rates of unemployment benefits, average production worker, single, 60th 
month of unemployment  
1997 48 58 50 61 60 25 54 
1999 60 54 46 54 60 23 54 
2002 50 51 45 51 58 27 61 
Sources: OECD Employment Outlook, various issues; OECD Benefit Systems and Work 
Intensives/OECD Benefits and Wages, various issues.  
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Table 2: Indicators of Labor Market Performance 
  
Country Denmark Sweden United  
Kingdom 
Switzerland Nether-
lands 
Spain Germany
Standardized unemployment rate, % of total labor force  
Average 1992-94 8,6 8,0 9,7 3,6 6,1 17,8 7,5 
Average 2002-04 5,2 5,6 4,9 3,9 3,7 11,1 8,9 
Change in PP -3,4 -2,4 -4,8 0,3 -2,4 -6,6 1,5 
Employment/population ratio, % of persons aged 15-64 years 
Average 1992-94 74,2 72,4 68,0 80,7 63,6 46,3 65,8 
Average 2002-04 75,8 74,2 72,8 78,1 73,7 60,7 65,1 
Change in PP 1,6 1,8 4,8 -2,6 10,1 14,4 -0,7 
Share of the long-term unemployed, % of total unemployment 
Average 1992-94 28,0 12,0 41,1 21,9 43,8 51,2 39,0 
Average 2002-04 20,7 19,2 22,5 27,2 29,5 39,2 49,9 
Change in PP -7,3 7,2 -18,6 5,3 -14,3 -12,0 10,9 
Average tenure, years 
1992 8,8 n.a. 8,1 n.a. 8,9 9,9 10,7 
2000 8,3 11,5 8,2 n.a. 9,1 10,1 10,5 
Change in % -5,7 8,5 1,2 n.a. 2,2 2,0 -1,9 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook and OECD Labor Force Statistics, various issues. For 
tenure: Auer/Cazes 2003, for Sweden change from 1995. 
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Table 3: Major Reforms in Selected Countries 
 
Country Active Labor Market 
Policy 
Unemployment 
Benefit System 
Activation Employment Protection 
Denmark 
 
 
 
 
 
After 1994 creation  of 
paid leave schemes and 
expansion of early retire-
ment (phased out after 
1996) 
After 2002/03 streamlin-
ing of active labor market 
policy instruments  
Since 1994 reductions of 
maximum duration of UI benefits 
from 9.5 to 4 years in 1999, but not
of benefit level 
 
Since 1994/95 progressive strictness of activa-
tion, mandatory participation in activating pro-
grams after 3 years of unemployment; job-search 
contracts 
1999 early activation after 1 year; activation for 
UA recipients 
After 2002 integration of activation for UI and 
UA claimants, activation from first day of unem
ployment  
-
No changes except liberalization of TWA in 1995 
Sweden 
 
 
 
 
Early 90s: expansion of 
program participation 
Late 90s: cut in partici-
pant inflow and resources  
1994-97: reduction of UI benefit 
level; introduction of waiting days 
2000: optional extension of benefit 
period to 600 days 
2000: ‘activation guarantee’ 
2001: stricter availability criteria  
1993: TWA permitted 
1994: changes in dismissal protection, withdrawn 
in 1995 
1997: liberalization of FTC 
United  
Kingdom 
 
 
Negligible role until intr
duction of New Deal 
programs in 1998 
o-
 
Reduction of benefit generosity 
and permissiveness 
1996: Jobseekers’ Allowance 
  
1987: activation through ‘Restart program’ 
1988: Family Credit  
1996: stricter activation via ‘Jobseekers’ Allow-
ance’ 
1998: ‘New Deal’ (workfare) 
1999: Working Families’ Tax Credit 
2003: Working Tax Credit 
1999: re-introduction of statutory minimum wage 
after abolition of Wage Councils in 1993; no sub-
stantial changes of EPL, but shorter trial periods in 
2000, maximum duration of FTC reduced to four 
years in 2002 
Switzerland
 
 
 
Increase in resources over 
the nineties 
1995: reduced duration of uncondi-
tional entitlement to 150 days; 
extended benefit duration (520 
days) depending on ALMP partici-
pation; maximum duration reduced 
to 400 days in 2003  
Since 1995/97 stricter activation regime No substantial changes  
Netherlands
 
 
Expansion of targeted 
subsidized employment 
after 1994 
 
2004: abolition of UA  
 
1996: Activation through stricter sanctioning   
2001: tax benefits for low-wage earners 
2002: Reform of public employment services 
1993-96: Removal of several thresholds relevant 
for part-time work  
1998: Liberalization of TWA  
1999: Higher employment security of FTC and 
TWA workers (“flexicurity”) accompanied by 
moderate reform of dismissal protection  
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Country Active Labor Market 
Policy 
Unemployment 
Benefit System 
Activation Employment Protection 
Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
Modest increase in re-
sources funded mainly 
from EU funds 
Cut of replacement rates in 
1992/93 
1992/93: stricter availability criteria 1984: liberalization of FTC, tightened in 1994 and 
2001 
1994 TWA permitted  
1994 less restrictive procedural requirements in 
dismissal protection  
1997 reduction of maximum compensation for 
unfair dismissal   
Germany 2003: Hartz I to III 2005: Abolition of UA (“Hartz 
IV”) 
2002: Shift towards activation (“Job Aqtiv”), 
furthered by subsequent Hartz reforms (2003-
05)  
1985: FTC without specific reason 
1994: relaxation of TWA provisions 
1996: liberalization of FTC and TWA, higher size 
threshold for dismissal protection, lowered again 
in 1999 
2002/03: abolition of major restrictions on TWA + 
equal pay or collective agreements 
2004 higher size threshold in dismissal protection 
Note: TWA means temporary work agencies, FTC fixed-term contracts, UI unemployment insurance, UA unemployment assistance. Source: 
Compilation by authors based on information from country studies; OECD 2004. 
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Table 4: Mapping Labor Market Reforms and Outcomes 
 
Labor Market Policies Labor Market 
Outcomes 
Country 
Active Passive Activa-
tion 
Employment  
Protection 
Unem-
ployment
Employ-
ment 
Long-
Term 
Unem-
ployment
Denmark ► ► ▲▲ ► ▼ ► ▼ 
Sweden ▲ -> ▼ ► ▲ Margin ▼ ▼ ▼ ▲ 
United Kingdom ▲ ▼ ▲▲ ►▲ ▼ ► ▼ 
Switzerland ▲ ▲ ▲▲ ► ► ► ▲ 
Netherlands ▲ ► ▲▲ Margin ▼  
-> Margin ▲ + 
Core ▼ 
▼ ▲ ▼ 
Spain ▲ ▼ ▲ Margin▼  
-> Margin ▲ + 
Core ▼ 
▼ ▲ ▼ 
Germany ▲ -> ▼ ► ▲(▲) Margin ▼ ▲ ► ▲ 
Source: Compilation by authors.  
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